Summary: This contribution analyzes whether remigration intentions and actual remigration to their homeland on the part of Turkish migrants to Germany have evolved over time, and if so, why. To do so, event-history analysis is applied to data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Findings reveal an increase in remigration intentions as well as rates of return for first generation migrants after the turn of the millennium. Before that, both such intentions and rates of actual return had declined, mostly as a consequence of integration in Germany. Those migrants who plan to return have a stronger emotional attachment to Turkey than those who plan to stay. However, the two groups differ neither with respect to their educational levels nor in terms of their perceptions of discrimination. There are similar findings with respect to the small though slightly increasing group of immigrants who actually returned to Turkey. It is thus argued that rising remigration intentions and actual remigration among first-generation migrants are unrelated to their integration into German society and are probably triggered by social change in their country of origin.
Introduction
In Germany, numerous media reports and first empirical studies have recently been published focusing on allegedly increasing emigration rates of Turks to Turkey (Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt 2012; Aydin 2010) . This literature conveys a strong impression that young and skilled Turks are the ones prone to turn their backs on Germany and remigrate to a prosperous homeland. This coincides with an increasing awareness that Germany needs well-educated immigrants to alleviate the consequences of population ageing and a shortage of skilled personnel. The factors triggering rising emigration rates are thought to be economic opportunities in a growing Turkey in combination with discrimination-related lack of opportunity in Germany (Aydin 2010) .
Official data does not shed much light on the scope and causes of this phenomenon. Firstly, the data are not reliable since many remigrants do not un-regis-ter in Germany. Secondly, it does not contain any information on skill level or emigration motives. And finally, it does not differentiate between, for example, a naturalized Turkish labor migrant returning to Anatolia and a German businesswoman moving to Istanbul. This lack of information on the scale and causes of recent patterns of remigration to Turkey is unfortunate from both a theoretical and a policy-oriented perspective.
Theoretically, the motivation of migrants to invest in host-country specific resources partly depends on their expected length of stay abroad. Accumulating these resources takes time and effort and is only worthwhile if they are expected to yield returns in the long run. Accordingly, remigration and emigration intentions have an impact on motivation to learn a host country's language, find a well-paying job, and invest in the success of one's children in school (Dustmann 1999 (Dustmann , 2000 . Furthermore, if Turks living in Germany showed a rising tendency to remigrate after years of life in Germany, this would pose a puzzle. Many empirical studies have suggested that due to a steady increase in social and economic ties in the host country, migrants become more prone to settle down over time (e. g., Massey 1986) .
From a policy perspective, high remigration rates among the young and skilled may weaken a country's chances to succeed in the often-cited international "race for talent" (Shachar 2006 ). This race centers on attracting skilled migrants and inducing them to stay, in other words, to not simply move to where their human capital yields the highest returns (Massey & Akresh 2006) . Migrants or individuals with roots abroad are more likely to make such a move and remigrate. On the one hand, they have access to migration networks that lower the costs and increase the benefits of moving (Massey & EspaÇa 1987) . On the other hand, many also possess resources that can be easily transferred to the country of origin -and "tastes" that render living there more attractive (Gundel & Peters 2008: 770) . It would represent a problem if this tendency was reinforced by better-educated migrants and their descendants having a sense that discrimination is impeding access to economic resources and social status.
Against this backdrop, our paper has a twofold purpose. Firstly, we wish to examine the question of whether emigration intentions and emigration rates have in fact increased among the population of Turkish origin living in Germany. To the extent this is indeed the case, we will, secondly, explain these changes. In this respect, we will focus on identifying those socio-demographic subgroups that trigger such an increase and on determining whether long-term changes in remigration rates and intentions can be accounted for by the explanatory factors usually discussed in studies on (re-)migration, i. e., migrants' social, economic, and emotional ties to the receiving and sending countries.
Theoretical background and existing findings
With respect to theory, remigration is simply another form of migration. As such, it is influenced by characteristics of individual migrants as well as by structural factors in the sending and receiving context. In the following, we will briefly review the most important theoretical arguments on remigration and present the relevant empirical findings on the according mechanisms.
Neoclassical economics and new economics of labor migration
Within individual-level approaches to migration such as neoclassical economics (NE) and new economics of labor migration (NELM), migrants' remigration behavior is influenced by their resources in both the receiving country and the country of origin and by the returns these resources are expected to yield in both contexts. 1 From a neoclassical perspective, remigration mostly occurs when immigrants either fail to find or lose a (good) job in the host country, so that the economic returns to migration are lower than expected. Meanwhile, the proponents of NELM have argued that migrants are target earners who are eager to return to the families they have left behind once they have accumulated enough money to compensate for certain market failures at home (Stark 1991) . In a similar vein, Borjas' seminal paper emphasizes that remigration can reflect "mistakes in the initial migration decision" but that it is also possible that remigration allows "some workers to attain higher utility or wealth than if the migration decision was permanent" (Borjas 1994 (Borjas : 1691 .
Empirical studies of remigration that start out from these approaches thus accentuate migrants' human capital endowments and their economic and social ties in the sending and receiving contexts.
2 The neoclassic assumption that remigration occurs when initial migration has turned out to be a failure has been confirmed in several studies: being jobless or working part-time increases the likelihood of return (Constant & Massey 2002; Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt 2012; Gundel & Peters 2008) . Inversely, a high income seems to be negatively correlated with return migration and intentions (Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt 2012; Constant & Massey 2002; Constant & Zimmermann 2012) .
Findings are mixed with respect to migrants' education. According to the mechanism proposed by Borjas & Bratsberg (1996) , migrants with higher educational levels who belong to low-skilled immigrant groups are more prone to remigrate, thereby increasing the group's original selectivity. Several studies support this argument (for Spain and Italy see De Haas & Fokkema 2011; for Germany Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt 2012;  3 for home-country schooling of Turks in Germany Constant & Massey 2002) . However, the effect on remigration intentions seems to be less clear (Steiner & Velling 1994) .
With respect to migrants' social ties, empirical evidence clearly shows that having children or a partner in the receiving country reduces both the chances of remigration and the intention to remigrate, especially when the partner is naturalized (Dustmann 1996) and children are in school. In turn, having a partner back home renders return migration more likely (Constant & Massey 2002; Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt 2012; Gundel & Peters 2008; Constant & Zimmermann 2012) .
The two theoretical approaches come to different conclusions regarding who remigrates with respect to characteristics such as work effort (i. e., working full-or part time), earnings and families ties in the receiving country (Constant & Massey 2002) . However, they share a focus on migrants' individual characteristics and resources and they lead to similar conclusions about long-term changes in remigration. Educational credentials, occupational status, skills in the host country's language, and contacts with non-migrant citizens evolve over time and can thus be expected to increase over time. In turn, resources in and ties to the sending country have mostly built up back home and can thus be expected to gradually wither. After all, the composition of ties and resources reflect migrants' investment decisions and resources that are acquired in the receiving country usually yield higher returns there than those acquired back home. Accordingly, within both theoretical approaches remigration rates and intentions should gradually decrease with increasing duration of stay.
Transnational accounts of migration and remigration call into question the universality of such a smooth settlement process and thus take a different point of view on migrants' remigration patterns.
Transnational approaches to remigration
Within transnational approaches, remigration is linked to and part of a broader pattern of transnational activities. Migrants are considered to belong to and participate in border-spanning social networks and activities that link sending and receiving countries through regular visits, trade and remittances, and association-based political and cultural activities (see Glick-Schiller 1999) . As a result, migrants maintain economic and social ties to their various countries of origin even if they gradually integrate into the host country. Once economic or political conditions in the receiving or sending context change, transnationally active migrants can promptly react to these changes since they possess skills, knowledge, and social ties valued in both contexts. Migration and remigration are thus considered circular rather than permanent in nature (Cassarino 2004 ; see also Constant & Zimmerman 2012) . With respect to the explanatory factors on the individual level, remigration is thus thought to have as much to do with involvement in reciprocal border-spanning networks than with narrowly defined economic or family ties in either context (Cassarino 2004) . In fact, transnational activities such as remittances have been shown to come along with higher return intentions; the same applies to investment back home (De Haas & Fokkema 2011 ; see also Dustmann & Mestres 2010) .
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Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 44, Heft 1, Februar 2015, S. 22-41 Furthermore, identificational ties and emotional attachments to the home country play an important role in transnational approaches to remigration. They affect the non-monetary costs of staying abroad permanently but have received considerably less attention than migrants' economic and social ties in the receiving and sending country. In the German case, identification with Germany and speaking the language have been shown to increase expected length of stay (Steiner & Velling 1994 ; for remigration behavior see Constant & Massey 2002) . In their study of migrants in Italy and Spain, De Haas & Fokkema (2011) have demonstrated that their socio-cultural integration is strongly related to a decline in return intentions.
Transnational approaches not only emphasize that it is important to consider a broader set of factors in explaining remigration than just economic and family ties. With respect to long term change in remigration rates they also imply that these do not necessarily decline over time, as suggested by NE and NELM. Rather, they may remain stable due to migrants' ongoing transnational involvement. However, the latter's persistence over time and generations has been questioned, both empirically and theoretically (Waldinger 2004 ; for transnational identifications see Snel et al. 2006: 303) . This debate notwithstanding, it seems possible that remigration rates decline or remain stable -depending on the extent of transnational activities. But it seems in any case unlikely that remigration increases after years of settlement -unless there is major economic or societal change in the receiving or sending context (Reagan & Olsen 2000) .
In sum, the empirical studies referred to so far have done a good job in explaining inter-individual variation in remigration behavior and intentions. They show that integration into the receiving society reduces the remigration probability and that ongoing transnational activities may decelerate this process. However, while all these studies try to explain who migrates and who does not, they say little about long-term changes in remigration rates. In the case of Germany, this is partly related to the fact that they rely on older data, whereas the currently discussed increase in remigration rates among Turks in Germany seems to be a rather recent phenomenon. More generally, the studies reviewed so far largely ignore the potential impact of macro-level changes in the receiving or sending country. These may render remigration over time more -or lessattractive independent of changes in migrants' individual resources, ties, and identifications.
Structural approaches to remigration
Structural approaches to remigration focus on its broader economic and social context: "As the structural approach to return migration contends, return is not only a personal issue, but above all a social and contextual one, affected by situational and structural factors." (Cassarino 2004: 257) Many of the sending countries for Western Europe's labor migrants have experienced periods of economic prosperity and have themselves becomeat least temporarily -attractive destinations for immigrants. But even without dramatic change abroad, migrants may become more prone to remigrate if returns to skill and education decrease in the receiving country, for example due to deteriorating economic conditions or rising levels of xenophobia. Studies that analyze the impact of structural change on remigration rates are rare. An exception is the analysis by Kuhlenkasper & Steinhardt (2012) on remigration patterns of migrants to Germany. The authors find a "rising effect" after the year 2000 "[that] is likely to be driven by the positive development of the Turkish economy" (2012: 21) but they do not pursue this argument any further. Kirdar shows that return migration from Germany reflects variation in purchasing power parity and that an increase in the latter leads to higher rates of remigration among middleaged migrants (Kirdar 2009) . A study by Massey et al. (2008) focuses on immigration from Poland to Germany but is nevertheless interesting against the backdrop of our research question. The authors show that macro-level changes need to be substantive or even "shock-like" in order to affect human behavior normally characterized by inertia and bounded rationality (Massey et al. 2008: 139) .
These different theoretical approaches and empirical studies reveal that a variety of explanatory variables and analytical levels need to be considered in a thorough analysis of remigration behavior. Proponents of neoclassical approaches and the new economics of labor migration focus on migrants' individual economic and social ties in the receiving and sending countries. Transnational approaches emphasize that through their involvement in transnational activities and networks, migrants often maintain homeland-related identities, business ties, and reciprocal social relationships. These are less narrowly defined than the individual resources and ties that are the focus of economic approaches. And structural approaches remind us that we need to take a closer look at macro-level changes in the sending and receiving countries that may trigger long-term changes in remigration rates.
A further insight from migration theory that needs to be taken into account when analyzing long-term changes in remigration is the differentiation between remigration intentions and actual moves. Going back to Speare, migration theorists have argued that a move becomes only likely for those persons that have ever thought about moving, and that these stages of the migration process follow a different logic (Kalter 2000: 462ff.) . In particular, perceived opportunity differentials between the country of origin and the receiving country should influence the emergence of a desire to move whereas the actual move is rather shaped by constraints, facilitators and resources. At this stage, perceptions of opportunity differentials only play a role by influencing migration intentions that usually precede actual moves (Kley 2011: 474) .
Before we will turn to a description and explanation of recent changes in intended and actual remigration among Turkish migrants to Germany we will offer some background information on the groups and contexts under consideration here. Based on this, we will specify our expected results. 
Turkish migrants' in Germany: integration process and transnational activities
With respect to their integration into German society, the Turkish-origin population still bears marks of the "guest worker" era. On average, Turks have limited language skills, lower educational credentials, higher rates of joblessness, lower income, and fewer social ties with Germans than other ethnic groups (Diehl & Schnell 2006; Kalter 2011; Luthra 2012) . Public attention is drawn to the alleged failure of Turkish migrants and their offspring to integrate "successfully". While their cultural background as Muslims is often held responsible for this in the populist debate on this issue (see Sarrazin 2010) , structural factors such as an ongoing ethnic replenishment, the larger size of this group (Esser 2008) , and ethnic discrimination dominate academic discourse.
Despite the fact that the integration of Turkish migrants -and of their children -lags behind that of other groups, there is no evidence that it does not progress over time and generations. Mostly due to rising levels of education, joblessness is lower among second than among first generation migrants (Herwig & Konietzka 2012) , and the former are more likely to work as white collar employees than members of their parents' generation (Granato & Kalter 2001) . They also have more contacts with Germans, higher rates of intermarriage (Nauck 2001; Schroedter & Kalter 2010) , better language skills; and they identify with Germany more strongly (Diehl & Schnell 2006) . Similarly, their ties to Turkey have weakened rather than strengthened because many know this country only from visits abroad. For example, the share of individuals remitting money declines with migrants' increasing duration of stay in Germany and rising levels of integration (Holst & Schrooten 2006) .
Based on this brief summary of Turkish migrants' integration processes it seems unlikely that long term changes in remigration rates reflect a stagnation or even reversal of their adaptation in Germany, or a sudden increase in their involvement in transnational activities. It might thus be worthwhile to take a closer look at macro-structural changes in Turkey and Germany that could independently affect remigration rates -especially when they come shock-like -according to structural approaches to remigration.
With respect to the situation in Turkey it is hardly possible to speak of any structural "shocks" but there has been significant economic and cultural change in the country (Gerhards & Hans 2011) . Above all, GDP increased substantially since 2001. Joblessness, however, has also increased and is currently at levels of about 10 percent. In the time period under consideration, the share of university graduates among the jobless population rose (World Bank 2014, see Figure 1 ). Cultural change has also been substantial, with Istanbul, always a vibrant capital at the border of Europe and Asia, now increasingly attracting international artists, students, and business people. At the same time, religious-conservative movements have become more prominent under the Erdogan government, with a growing presence of Islam in the public sphere.
Turning to the macro-structural context in Germany, it seems unlikely that economic change has triggered rising emigration rates. After all, the European and international financial crisis has affected Germany less than many other European immigrant destinations. However, media reports on Turkish outmigration often claim that the situation has become worse in terms of general acceptance in Germany of Turkish migrants and their children. Available data on majority members' attitudes shows that Germans tend to be not only more prejudiced and to show higher levels of social distance toward Turkish migrants and their children as compared to members of other ethnic minorities in the country (Blohm & Wasner 2008) . Turks themselves report incidences of discrimination more often than immigrants from other countries (Hans 2010: 286) . There is some field-experimental evidence on labor market discrimination (Kaas & Manger 2010) even though the lower labor-market position of Turkish migrants is mainly a result of their comparatively low educational credentials (Granato & Kalter 2001) . But what about long-term changes in (perceptions of) discrimination? In fact, the debate about the compatibility of Islam with Western culture has gained momentum in Germany since the turn of the last century but reliable empirical evidence on this dimension of structural change is mixed. On the one hand, perceptions of cultural distance between Turks and Germans have increased since the mid-1990s. 5 On the other hand, most indicators have shown the level of Islamophobia in the country to be stable -at a relatively high level (Kühnel & Leibold 2007) . According to data from the German socio-economic Panel (SOEP), perceptions of discrimination are lower among second than among first generation migrants but have overall remained stable over time -again at comparatively high levels. 6 While these changes can hardly be described as "shock-like" there is a possibility that today, particularly educated Turks or Germans with Turkish roots feel increasingly bothered by a continuing lack of social acceptance in Germany. For some migrants, the gap between expectations and reality may thus have widened during the last decade, even if the situation as a whole has not changed dramatically for the worse (for this "integration paradox", see Kessler et al. 1999; ten Teije et al. 2013) . Apart from the possibility that skilled Turks in particular suffer increasingly from a lack of social acceptance and opportunities, there is no evidence that there are any disruptions in the integration process of Turkish migrants and their children that may have rendered remigration more attractive.
Remigration of Turkish migrants in Germany:
expected results
We will now turn to our own analysis of the longterm dynamics of remigration behavior and intentions of Turks in Germany. Empirical studies of this aspect of remigration behavior and intentions are so far almost nonexistent. We will start out by describing changes in remigration rates and intentions and by examining the question of whether potentially rising remigration rates and intentions are caused by individual-level changes in the characteristics and resources that have been shown to affect past remigration, most importantly migrants' economic and social ties to both their home their and host countries. According to NE and NELM, these characteristics influence migrants' desire to stay abroad or to return to their -or their parents' -country of origin. The more human and social capital from one context they possess, the more likely it is that they move to or stay in the context where these resources yield high returns, or that they plan to do so. We will also take a closer look at the variables that are in the focus of transnational approaches on remigration, namely border-crossing activities and homeland related identities. Since we have shown that these ties and resources reflect Turkish migrants' ongoing integration process in Germany and since neither empirical evidence nor theoretical reasoning suggests that transnational activities have increased over time we assume that a potential increase in Turkish migrants' remigration rates and intentions does neither reflect a disruption in their integration process (i. e. their ties to and economic and social resources) in Germany nor an increase in their transnational ties and activities.
Structural approaches to remigration are difficult to test with individual-level data. However, we want to give it a try by analyzing whether rising levels of estrangement from Germany and increasing perceptions of discrimination have triggered rising remigration rates and intentions. On the one hand, we have shown above that it seems unlikely that these have increased strongly and suddenly enough to overcome inertia that characterizes migration behavior. On the other hand, it seems nevertheless possible that stable or slightly increasing perceptions of discrimination and estrangement from Germany among the Turkish origin population in Germany have rendered remigration more attractive. These attitudinal and emotional variables may, however, have a different impact on emigration intentions and behavior. Dissatisfaction with the situation in Germany can be expected to have an impact on emigration intentions -and being asked about such intentions may even offer an opportunity to express respective dissatisfaction in a survey -but may not have any behavioral implications. Emigrating is a big step that raises substantial costs and that is probably less influenced by attitudinal variables. As Senyürekli & Menjìvar (2012: 15) put it: "Decisions to return (or stay) are more often shaped by the social context and structural factors than by an individual will or motivation." The latter should thus influence migration decisions only indirectly by affecting remigration intentions preceding actual moves (Kley 2011) . We thus expect, secondly, that a potential increase in Turkish migrants' remigration intentions has been triggered by increasingly negative attitudes and feelings about Germany but that the latter have not affected migrants' remigration behavior.
Our analysis will enable us to at least indirectly assess the role of macro-structural changes in Turkey:
We take into account different individual-level variables from a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches to remigration, notably NE, NELM, and transnational approaches. Furthermore, we capture macro-structural change in Germany, i. e., "historically" changing perceptions of discrimination and exclusion, by controlling migrants' attitudes and feelings about Germany such as their perceptions of discrimination and their estrangement with their host country. We thus assume, without being able to test this argument directly with the data at hand, that potentially remaining changes in Turkish' migrants' remigration intentions and behavior (after controlling for change in their ties to and resources in both contexts, in transnational activities, and in perceptions of discrimination and exclusion in Germany) reflect macro-structural change in Turkey. The latter may lead to the perception that returns to human and social and cultural capital (e. g., language skills) are higher in the country of origin than in the country of destination and that this is the best moment to return.
Data and methods
In our analysis, we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), which offers information on private households in Germany (www.diw.de/de/soep). This dataset has been used in numerous studies of inter-individual variation in remigration intentions and behavior for a number of reasons. First of all, in this data set labor migrants from Turkey were oversampled when the original sample was taken in 1984 so that case numbers are large enough. Second, SOEP data provides longitudinal information on a broad range of topics since the same households stay in the panel as long as possible -including individuals who join these households as, for example, children, partners, and immigrants (Wagner et al. 2007 ). Third and finally, the data set contains information on panel dropouts so that remigrants can be identified and remigration can be analyzed prospectively (Neiss & Kroh 2012) .
Persons who were no longer interviewed in the SOEP because they left Germany are coded as "remigrants" in the lifespell data set. This dataset contains all available information about the whereabouts of respondents who no longer participate in the survey. For some cases, the information that a former respondent who could not be found at his/ her last address has emigrated has been collected by interviewers, mostly by talking to other household members or neighbors. For other cases, drop-out studies provide this sort of information. These studies draw on official register data which contain the information that someone has moved abroad as long as the person has deregistered. The number of former respondents coded as "remigrants" probably includes a few persons who moved to a country other than their country of origin. Strictly speaking, we do not know to which country a person coded as an "emigrant" has moved. However, official migration statistics show that the vast majority of Turkish emigrants from Germany moves (back) to Turkey. 7 Similarly, some respondents who may have moved back might not have been coded correctly as remigrants (Constant & Massey 2002) .
Respondents have also been asked -in each SOEP wave from 1984 to 2011 -whether they plan to stay in Germany forever or to take up residence for a certain amount of time only. Individuals who replied in the negative to the question of whether they wished to stay in Germany forever are coded as individuals with an intention to remigrate.
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While most studies presented above use older SOEP waves, we will include all available survey waves in our analysis . In order to rule out that compositional changes caused by refreshment samples are responsible for the observed changes in remigration intentions and rates we control for respondents' duration of stay in Germany (for first generation migrants). We also conduct a robustness check by running a model restricted to those respondents who have participated since 1984. Given the debate on Turkish remigration, we restrict our study to first and second generation migrants (respectively, to those who immigrated at the age of 6 or older, and those who immigrated before the age of 6 or were born in Germany but have at least one foreign born parent) from Turkey. We do not differentiate between Germans and Turks in our analysis because holding German citizenship has either no or a negative effect (as an indicator of integration) on remigration intentions or behavior From a theoretical viewpoint, we wish to determine, first, whether and, if so, why a rising number of individuals have decided, over time, not to stay in Germany forever ("remigration intention") or has left the country ("remigration behavior"). We use event-history analysis in order to look closely at the effect of the year of observation. Because intentions and behavior are recorded only once a year in the SOEP although they can occur at any time between surveys, we employ discrete-time models (Allison 1982: 63) . We estimate the probability that an event that has not yet occurred will happen at a certain point in time and specify how this probability depends on the year of observation and other explanatory variables (Allison 1982: 70ff.; Yamaguchi 1991: 17ff.) . So, in terms of the chronology of changes in independent and dependent variables, discrete-time models enable us to draw causal conclusions. Each year that a person is exposed to the risk of experiencing the event is taken as a separate observation. In the case of remigration intentions, the risk period begins when the person indicates for the first time that s/he intends to stay forever in Germany -those who never intended to stay in Germany forever are thus excluded from the data set (similar to never married individuals being excluded from an analysis on divorce). Over the whole observation period, this was the case for 556 out of 2264 Turkish immigrants. The risk period ends the year this intention is given up, in other words when the person considers remigration for the first time or -if the intention to stay remains stable -with the most recent available observation. If a person switches back and forth between an intention to stay in Germany and a remigration intention, we treat each of these transitions as a separate event. Such multi-episode data alleviate the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (Brüderl 2008) because FE-logit models use within information and provide unbiased estimates if unobservables are time-constant. 9 We thus estimate these models in our robustness checks. In the case of remigration behavior, the risk period begins when a respondent is included in the SOEP 10 and ends when he or she has either quit the survey panel due to emigration, death, refusal (but still living in Germany) or with the most recent available survey year for that person. 11 We thus use different subsamples for our analysis on remigration intentions and behavior.
In our baseline model we include year of measurement as well as socio-demographic control variables that are unrelated to the relevant theoretical arguments, i. e., age, sex, education and family status 12 . We then add indicators for the theoretically relevant explanatory factors identified above in order to see how their insertion into the model affects the coefficient for year of measurement -the variable that captures changes in remigration over time. Resources and ties in the sending and the receiving context (i. e., integration in Germany) are in the focus of NE and NELM. In our analysis, they are measured as migrants' Turkish and German language skills, occupational status, the presence of family members in Turkey, and/or Germany and children living in the household in Germany. Contacts with majority members include visiting Germans and being visited by them. Transnational activities and identificational ties with the country of origin are measured as remittances and visits to Turkey, as feelings of being at home during these visits, and in terms of identification with Turkey ("feeling Turkish").
In order to capture the impact of structural change in Germany in the sense of growing levels of xenophobia and exclusion that may have triggered long term increase in remigration rates or intentions, we include respondents' perceptions that he or she has been discriminated against in Germany and "feels German" (see Table A3 in the online appendix for codings and other details). 13 In all multivariate models we control but do not display the mostly insignificant results for time since migration (for immigrants). By doing this, we make sure that rising levels of remigration (intentions) do not reflect compositional changes in the sample in terms of mi- 9 Using only within information shows the effect of individual change in an independent variable over the lifecourse on the dependent variable. Thereby, occurrence dependence can be estimated net of self-selection (Brüderl 2008; Giesselmann & Windzio 2012) . 10 The actual start of the risk period is the year of immigration, which in most cases is prior to the observation window. For these respondents we can only control for the year since migration. Partially censored data on the left only allows analysis conditional on the fact that the individual has survived (i. e., not yet emigrated) before the start of the observation (Blossfeld et al. 2007: 40).
11 See Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix (www.zfsonline.org) for the organization of our data set. 12 Education and family status would only become theoretically relevant variables if we were to differentiate further where education took place and where the partner lives. We decided not to do this because there are very few individuals with a partner living abroad who have ever planned to stay in Germany forever. Furthermore, if we differentiated between education completed abroad and in Germany we would have had to calculate different models for first and second generation migrants. 13 If relevant information is missing for a certain survey year, we have replaced it with information available from the most recent year. We use dummy variables for most variables and control for refusals through missing dummies.
grants' duration of stay in the country that may be systematically related to their remigration behavior or intentions. As an additional robustness check, we limit our analysis on remigration intentions to the subpopulation of those Turkish migrants who have been included in the SOEP since 1984. We also calculate a piecewise constant model as an alternative modelling strategy and a model excluding left truncated events to make sure that we do not underestimate the duration in risk period time, which might have also consequences for the effect of other independent variables. We also re-analyze -as far as case numbers allow -respective models by using extra-reliable information on education over the whole observation period.
Findings
We will begin our empirical analysis with a descriptive overview of our variables and then present the multivariate results regarding the factors that trigger long-term changes in remigration rates and intentions.
Changes in remigration rates and intentions
over time -some descriptive evidence Figure 2 displays the annual proportion of first and second generation Turks who stated that they do not want to stay in Germany forever ("remigration intention") and of those who have been coded as "emigrants". The figure shows that for first-generation Turks, remigration intentions decreased almost steadily until the turn of the last century. These results demonstrate that while there is some empirical reality behind the public debate outlined in the introduction to our paper, two important specifications are necessary. First, the increase we have confirmed is much more prominent on the attitudinal level (that of intentions) than on the be-Notes: weighted results (cross weights used for remigration intentions and first wave weights used for remigration behavior). The sharp drop in the first two SOEP years may partly reflect the return policy of the German government that gave financial bonuses to return migrants and partly drop out that is usually high in the early years of a panel and that may have been readily attributed to remigration by the interviewers. havioral level (that of actual remigration). Second, it affects first generation migrants rather than their children. With this clarification, we can now turn to the factors that trigger rising rates of remigration intentions (and, though less pronounced, remigration rates) after years of living in Germany.
Why have remigration intentions and rates increased?
In order to address this question, we will formulate separate models for the time period before and after the increase around the turn of the last century (i. e., until 2001 and after 2001). Prior to presenting our multivariate analysis, we will take a brief look at the distribution of the independent variables in these two time periods by generation. This will enable us to assess if there has been any substantial change with respect to factors that have been shown to affect remigration behavior and intentions in existing studies, most importantly migrants' ties and resources in Germany and Turkey, their transnational activities, and their identifications with and attitudes about Germany.
As can be seen in Table 1 generation migrants. The share of individuals with more than basic education has increased over time, especially for second generation migrants. Indicators of both groups' social ties show that the share of Turks whose relatives are mostly living in Turkey has declined sharply from the first to the second generation. Surprisingly, social ties to Germans have decreased over time despite the second generation being more integrated socially than the first. As expected, the share of individuals who speak German well is much higher among those who were born in Germany than among those who immigrated, but there is only moderate change over time.
Transnational activities such as remittances are clearly limited to a minority of migrants (3 to 16 %). They are higher for first than for second generation migrants even though the two groups converged somewhat after 2001. A large share of migrants from both generations has traveled to Turkey but a comparatively small share has felt at home right away during these visits, especially among those who were born in Germany. Interestingly, the national identification of the migrants shows a classical pattern of assimilation: Identification with Turkey decreases over time and identification with Germany correspondingly increases over time. Experiences of discrimination are similarly high for both groups and have remained stable over time; every second Turk has had such experiences. Overall, there is no evidence for a disruption in the integration process or an alienation from Germany that may have triggered rising remigration intentions or rates. The declining share of Turks who have visited Germans in their homes and have been visited by them is an interesting exception to this rule.
Starting out from these distributions it seems unlikely that rising remigration intentions reflect weakening (strengthening) ties to and identifications with Germany (Turkey). Our multivariate analysis will provide further insight into the relationship between immigrants' characteristics considered so far and their remigration intentions and behavior -and into the changes herein. We first address socio-demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and education in order to analyze which subgroups have been especially likely to develop remigration intentions or to have emigrated over time. In a second step, we assess the impact of migrants' social, economic, and cultural ties and resources in Germany and Turkey and their transnational activities. In a third step, we study the role of respondents' subjective perceptions of and identification with Germany. In all models, we include the year of observation to study change over time (see Table 2 ).
Our results confirm that for first generation migrants from Turkey, SOEP year has a negative effect -i. e., remigration intentions have decreased -until 2001, even if possible socio-demographic composi- Table 2 Remigration intentions of first generation immigrants: discrete time models, hazard ratios tional effects are controlled for. Female and married respondents are more likely to have remigration intentions. With respect to remigration intentions, we cannot confirm findings from earlier studies (see above, footnote 3) that Turks with higher levels of education are particularly prone to remigrate. The fit of the model increases substantially if we take migrants' economic, social, and cultural ties in Germany and Turkey and their transnational activities into account. 14 Interestingly, retired people are not those who are most likely to plan remigration. At this stage in life remigration illusions appear to have largely either become reality or been abandoned. The other variables point in the expected direction: The presence of relatives in the country and children in the household tend to decrease remigration intentions while transnational activities such as sending remittances increase them. The models suggest that remigration intentions are not only a matter of economic and social ties and resources. Those who identify with and feel at home in Turkey during visits plan to remigrate more often. With respect to migrants' identification with Germany the opposite holds true. Nevertheless, the negative effect of the SOEP year for the pre-2002 period remains stable and significant once migrants' identifications are taken into account. Obviously, settlement intentions increased in the period under consideration independently of increasing economic, social, and emotional ties to Germany. The results of the robustness checks are displayed in Table A4 (online appendix). Overall, they confirm the results presented here.
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So far, our findings are neither new nor surprising. This changes when we turn to the models for the period after 2001. As suggested by the descriptive results presented above, these models show a significant and stable positive effect for year of measurement. Apart from that, the models for both the time periods under consideration look rather similar. An interesting difference between the pre-and post-2001 models is that identification with Germany -despite increasing over time -is no longer negatively related to remigration. This contradicts the idea that a withering identification with Germany is triggering remigration plans. Rather, identification with Germany is no longer a barrier to remigration. The finding that experiences of discrimination are completely unrelated to migrants' remigration intentions backs this interpretation. Remitting is no longer positively related to remigration after 2001 but this change may reflect small numbers of remitting individuals.
Overall, the stable and positive effect of the year of measurement in the post-2001 models shows that the post-2001 increase in remigration intentions cannot be accounted for by the factors included in our models. For example, the positive effect of the year of measurement does not vanish once migrants' decreasing social ties to Germans (see variable "visits to and from Germans" until 2001 and afterwards in Table 1 ) are controlled for. Since SOEP data allows us to control for an encompassing range of factors driving remigration intentions, it seems quite possible that rising remigration intentions are related to processes in the country of origin rather than to the situation of Turkish migrants in Germany.
Models for second generation Turks born and raised in Germany confirm our descriptive findings that this group's remigration intentions decreased until 2001. However, our multivariate findings for the period after 2001 demonstrate that these intentions remain stable -and do not increase as they do for first generation migrants. Apart from this important difference, the results are basically the same as for first generation Turks. Ties in Germany, notably the presence of relatives and identification with Germany correspond with a low intention to remigrate while the opposite is true for Turkish-language skills and identification with Turkey. Again, experiences of discrimination are unrelated to remigration intentions, and this is the case with the migrants' level of education as well.
In order to analyze actual remigration behavioras well the link between remigration intentions and actual remigration -we will now take a closer look at the dynamics at work in Turkish migrants' remiClaudia Diehl & Elisabeth Liebau: Turning back to Turkey -Or Turning the Back on Germany? 35 14 The calculation of likelihood-ratio tests in nested models shows that with one exception (second generation migrants after 2001), all models including a further set of independent variables have significantly more explanatory power than the previous model (p < .05). 15 In the model restricted to those respondents who are in the SOEP since 1984, some coefficients (year of measurement, occupational status retired, family ties) lose their significance -probably due to the smaller sample sizewithout changing their direction. The comparison between discrete-time and fixed-effect models shows that, with the exception of family ties, good Turkish language skills, and remittances, the results presented above are confirmed. For these variables, level rather than causal effects seem to be at work, i. e., those who speak Turkish are more likely to have an intention to remigrate whereas those whose Turkish skills increase do not show a rising tendency to remigrate. The piecewise constant model and the model excluding left truncated events reveal results similar to those of the full model. gration behavior. Again, we compare the two time periods and calculate the same models that were used for remigration intentions. Results are displayed graphically in Figure 3 (for full tables see Table A5 in the online appendix, for descriptives see Table 1 ).
Similarly to the findings regarding remigration intentions, we can observe a negative and stable effect of year of measurement until 2001. With the inclusion of controls for migrants' ties and resources (most importantly Turkish language skills and having a job in Germany), this effect becomes much smaller and is no longer statistically significant. This suggests that remigration decreased between the mid-1980s and the turn of the millennium because migrants' ties in Germany became stronger.
After 2001, we find a positive effect for year of measurement, which reveals that not only remigration intentions have increased over time but actual remigration did as well. Our multivariate analysis produces two remarkable findings: First, the coefficient for year of measurement does not merely remain stable once migrants' resources and ties are controlled for but actually becomes larger. Obviously, remigration would have increased more strongly than it actually did if the integration of Turkish migrants (through holding a job, having a family, identifying with Germany) had not progressed over time. Second, the strong positive effect of the year of measurement remains stable even if we control for remigration intentions. As expected, these have a strong positive effect on actual remigration independent of the time period under con- sideration (overall 74 percent of the Turkish migrants who remigrated stated an intention to migrate in the year before remigration). Remigration has thus become more likely even for those who have not already had remigration intentions. Analyses presented in the full models (see Table A5 ) reveal that the small though slightly increasing group of Turkish immigrants returning to Turkey does not have a clear profile in terms of educational level and both identification with and perceptions of Germany, even though Turkish language skills and identification with Turkey do have a positive effect on remigration.
Remigration intentions may be something quite different than actual behavior, and the findings are mixed with respect to our expectation that remigration intentions reflect attitudinal and emotional variables to a greater extent than remigration behavior. While identification with Turkey enhances remigration rates and intentions, identification with Germany tends to reduce remigration intentions but not behavior. Feelings of discrimination are unrelated to both variables.
Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed how the remigration intentions and actual remigration of Turkish migrants have evolved over time. While several SOEP-based studies of remigration have been published since the 1990s, our study has a new focus. We describe and analyze long-term rate changes between the mid-1980s and the present. Our findings show that some empirical reality corresponds to the current debate about Turks returning to Turkey in increasing numbers but that the perception of this phenomenon needs to be qualified in several important respects.
First, while there was in fact an increase in remigration intentions and rates for first-generation migrants after the turn of the millennium, we can see that there has been no such increase in intentions on the part of second generation migrants. In addition, very few German-born individuals with Turkish-born parents actually return to Turkey. Second, empirical evidence does not suggest that it is the better educated who plan to leave the country. In a similar vein, those who indicate an intention to return neither identify less strongly with Germany nor do they feel discriminated against more frequently than those who intend to stay.
In our analysis we drew upon a broad set of theoretical approaches to remigration. In that framework, we have found that for first generation migrants after 2001, rising rates of intended and actual remigration have been unrelated to their integration into German society -a process that has not shown any signs of disruption. In fact, without the ongoing integration of Turkish migrants their remigration rate would have been higher after 2001. This supports our argument that changes in migrants' ties and identifications with Germany or in their host-country related resources have not triggered the phenomena under consideration here but that these are related to processes in the country of origin. It is in fact those migrants who still identify as Turks and who still possess the necessary resources, most importantly Turkish language skills, who (plan to) re-settle in Turkey.
Of course, our analysis also has limitations. First of all, the sample of migrants included in the SOEP tends to be somewhat skewed. Recent immigration cohorts are underrepresented in the SOEP and the sample of migrants included in the survey panel may be skewed towards the better integrated individuals since marginalized migrants might be more difficult to re-interview. However, while our descriptive analysis may be somewhat flawed by this sample selectivity, our multivariate analysis shows that the effect of year of observation after 2001 remains stable even after controlling for compositional change in the sample (for example with respect to migrants' duration of stay in Germany). Secondly, emigration is coded in the SOEP and this dataset is often used for studies on emigration but even this coding has its limits and may not be totally reliable: Some "re-migrants" may have moved to another country than their country of origin; similarly, some respondents who may have moved back might not have been coded correctly as remigrants (Constant & Massey 2002 ). However, it seems rather unlikely that this affects the two time periods under consideration here -until 2001 and after 2001 -in a different way, and a general underor overcount of remigration is unlikely to affect our main findings. Thirdly, the sample of migrants included in our analysis has become increasingly selective over time with respect to their remigration intentions. This however, leads to an under-rather than overestimation of remigration intentions over time because many migrants with intentions to leave have already done so. This increasing selectivity, in fact, renders it even more astounding that remigration intentions have increased after 2001.
We applied several robustness-checks: We restricted our analysis on remigration intentions to the subsample of those migrants who are included in the SOEP since 1984 to check for changes in the sample composition; we estimated FE-logit models in order to additionally settle issues of causality; we calculated a piecewise constant model and a model excluding left truncated events (see Table A4 ). We also re-analyzed our models by using extra-reliable information on education over the whole observation period and by using the same cases in all models. Our main findings remain stable across all models.
Conclusions
Overall, we are thus quite confident that our main finding is reliable. However, the most serious limitation of our study is that with the data at hand we cannot further qualify our assumption that pull-factors in Turkey are triggering rising emigration rates. We do not know a great deal about the nature of dynamics in Turkey that may render remigration more appealing but we believe that the economic opportunities of a prospering country play an important role in this respect. Even though joblessness overall increased rather than decreased after the turn of the last century (as did the share of individuals with some sort of tertiary education among the unemployed), it is quite possible that economic change in specific economic niches such as tourism have rendered remigration attractive for migrants who are able to work as mediators between German and Turkish culture. Furthermore, further research needs to assess if Kirdar's argument that among middle-aged first generation migrants, a higher purchasing power parity enhances their proneness to return because it becomes more attractive to spend their earnings back home (2009: 424) , can explain long-term trends in Turkish migrants emigration rates.
We also tested alternative ideas about macro-structural change in Turkey, namely that cultural rather than economic change is responsible for rising remigration intentions. Further analyses not presented here support our assumption that these dynamics involve economic factors rather than cultural change: Religious Turks -i. e., those who frequently attend religious services -are not more likely to return to Turkey than less religious Turks. In other words, remigration is not particularly appealing to migrants who are very religious. The same holds true for easy-at-hand alternative explanations such as rising shares of Turks holding a German passport who are able to travel back and forth between Germany and Turkey as they like:
German citizenship is unrelated or -as an indicator of integration in Germany -negatively related to remigration intentions and behavior. And according to SOEP data, the increase in remigration intentions and behavior cannot be found for other immigrant groups but is typical for Turks. It does thus not reflect a general increase in international mobility (see Gerhards & Hans 2013 ).
However, unless truly border-spanning data sets become available, many assumptions about the factors triggering rising remigration intentions and rates among Turkish immigrants remain speculative. Only such data would allow us to follow up emigrants after they have again become immigrants -to the very country they once left.
